Plaintiff and Appellant
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, WILL HUMBLE, et al
Defendants and Respondents
|Case No.: LC2014-000443-001 DT
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND INJUNCTION AGAINST WILL HUMBLE AND THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES TO STOP DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE AND DAMAGING INFORMATION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS CASE
The Honorable Judge
1. Arlin Troutt (“the Plaintiff”) requests reconsideration of the Minute Entry filed with the Clerk of Courts on January, 26, 2015 in this matter. Judge McClennen Denied the Plaintiff’s (November 14, 2014) REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION AND DE NOVO HEARING OF CASE NO.: 2014C-MMR-0312-DHS and the Plaintiff’s (January 2, 2015) REQUEST FOR DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND INJUNCTION AGAINST WILL HUMBLE AND THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES TO STOP DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE AND DAMAGING INFORMATION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS CASE (“the Requests”).
2. In the (December 8, 2014) APPELLEE’S RESPONSE TO “RESONSE [SIC] TO MINUTE ENTRY AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION AND DE NOVO ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH HEARING OF CASE NO.: 2014-C-MMR-0312-DHS (“the Response”), the Arizona Department of Health Services (“AzDHS”) used the word “stay” 13 times. The Plaintiff would remind this Honorable Court that the Plaintiff never used the word “stay” or requested a stay on an administrative decision once.
3. It seems the Court has ruled with the AzDHS and Denied the Plaintiff’s November 14, 2014 and January 2, 3015 motions in this continuing effort to get a “plain and simple statutory interpretation of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) from the Arizona Courts.
4. The following was taking from the Plaintiff’s November 14, 2014 Request: “There should be no argument here that the Appellant is at a great disadvantage in simply trying to get a clarification and rulings in this dispute over the intent, meaning, interpretation and the actual legal authority that is granted in the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (“AMMA”).” (Page 3, lines 10-13.
5. The following is taken from the “RELIEF REQUESTED” in the Plaintiff’s November 14, 2014 Request: Request #2: “The Appellant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to review the intent, meaning, language and the authority granted by the AMMA and clarify this time-sensitive dispute over the intent, language and authority granted in the AMMA as quickly as possible.” (Page 4, lines 23-25) and Request #3: “The Appellant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue and Order an Injunction that would protect the Appellant and other critically ill patients from harm caused by this mischaracterization of the intent of the AMMA and the misinterpretation of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(F).” (Page 5, lines 1-4).
6. The Plaintiff was clearly not “requesting a stay” on a Decision by the AzDHS that is not even supported by the English language much less the intent and meaning of the law.
7. This confusing (December 8, 2014) AzDH Response forced the Plaintiff to file another motion on January 2, 2015 to stop this damaging mistranslation of the English language and the misrepresentation of material facts in this case.
8. The Court noted in the January 26, 2015 Minute Entry that: “Troutt has filed an appeal from the Decision of the AzDHS dated August 19, 2014”. This is correct but the Plaintiff filed a complaint with the AzDHS on May 10, 2014 prior to expiration of the Plaintiff’s AzDHS identification card and the AzDHS refusal to renew. The AzDHS did not even deny Plaintiff’s right to cultivate until May 14, 2014.
9. The following is taken from the original complaint filed by the Plaintiff in this matter on May 10, 2014: “The State of Arizona (State), the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), and ADHS director Mr. Will Humble have a long andwell-documented history of opposing medical marijuana use and obstruction of the electorate’s intent to legalize marijuana since 1996. There is dangerous and damaging confusion that has required declaratory judgments, injunctions and rulings by the court regarding the same or similar complaints of abuse by the State and ADHS concerning the actual language and protections in the ARIZONA MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT (AMMA). The legality and or constitutionality of this language, obstruction of the ADHS rulemaking process, interpretations and promulgation of these interpretations by the State, ADHS and their agents and employees has all come into question.(Page 1, lines 22-25 to Page 2, lines 1-6)
10. The following was also taken from the Plaintiff’s (May 14, 2014) Response to the AzDHS Denial to cultivate: Plaintiff did not “submit a request”, and did not request to cultivate marijuana plants based on the “Plaintiff’s residence” as Robert Lane alleged. (Page 11, lines 20-25)
11. On June 2, 2014 the Plaintiff delivered the: RESPONSE TO ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL AND COMPLAINT AGAINST DEPARTMENT FOR INTIMIDATION, COERSION, THREATS AND OTHER DAMGES ASSOCIATED WITH AN AGENCY ACTION REGARDING FEES AND APPLICATION RENEWAL MODIFICATION
12. The AzDHS is alleging to this Court that their translation of the 37 words in A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) is a restriction. It is not. The (December 8, 2014) ADHS RESPONSE states: “The twenty-five mile rule was intended to be a restriction on the personal cultivation of marijuana under AMMA.” (Page 10, lines 14-15)
13. The AzDHS (December 8, 2014) RESPONSE states: “A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) is the only provision in AMMA that allows a qualifying patient to request authorization to cultivate.” (Page 6, lines 27-28 to Page 7, line 1) A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) does not mention a request for authorization to cultivate. A “written certification” from a physician is an authorization to cultivate and use marijuana. That “written certification” and “authorization” does not come from the AzDHS. The Plaintiff was required to submit information not a request.
14. The AzDHS (December 8, 2014) RESPONSE includes the “exact” language of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f): “A. A qualifying patient may apply to the department for a registry identification card by submitting: 3. An application, including: f) A designation as to who will be allowed to cultivate marijuana plants for the qualifying patient’s medical use if a registered nonprofit medical marihuana dispensary is not operating within twenty-five miles of the qualifying patient’s home.” (Page 7, lines 2-9)
15. The AzDHS (December 8, 2014) RESPONSE then goes on to state: “The Department interpreted A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) to mean exactly what it says”. (Page 7, lines 21-22)
16. This statement by the AzDHS is false, ridiculous and insulting to the Plaintiff’s intelligence. This AzDHS statement is a blatant misrepresentation of a material fact in this case. The Plaintiff humbly requests this Honorable Court to resolve this matter before the filing date of the Plaintiff’s Opening Brief.
17. The first 18 words of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02 (A)(3)(f) only tells a “certified patient” what to submit to get an AMMA registration card. There’s no restriction found in these plain and simple words.
18. The last 37 words in A.R.S. § 36-2804.02 (A)(3)(f) only asks a certified patient to nominate a preference based on the patient’s belief.
19. The AzDHS is claming that the exact meaning of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) “says” that A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) is a restriction on personal cultivation. Where is a “restriction” of any kind found in the plain and simple language of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02 (A)(3)(f)? Who is Correct?
20. The Plaintiff cannot afford expert witnesses on the translation of the English language or expert testimony from law professors on the statutory construction and statutory interpretation of law to clarify the intent and meaning of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f).
21. However, the Plaintiff has made a study of the process of “statutory construction and interpretation and offers the following to the Court: Statutory Construction is the process of determining what a particular statute means so that a court may apply the statute accurately. Any question of statutory interpretation starts with a look at the plain language of the statute to discover its original intent. To discover a statute’s original intent, courts first look to the words of the statute and apply their usual and ordinary meanings. The court is merely an interpreter of the law.
22. The United States Supreme Court has this to say about statutory construction and statutory interpretation: “We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.:” Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al.,447 U.S. 102 (1980). “[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, “when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.'” 503 U.S. 249, 254.
23. This dispute is not about the proximity of the Plaintiff’s residence to an AzDHS pot shop and it never was. This simple dispute regards a translation of the plain and simple meaning of the English language that the Plaintiff and all Arizona voters were provided before they approved the removal of criminal statutes for the cultivation and medical use of marijuana.
24. This is a matter of fact that has been well documented and ignored by the AzDHS. For this reason the Plaintiff agrees with this Honorable Court’s Order denying the Plaintiff’s request for a De Novo Hearing of this case. The Plaintiff is not asking for stays, delays or word game plays in this case.
25. However, the Court’s Denial of the Plaintiff’s (January 2, 2015) REQUEST FOR DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND INJUNCTION AGAINST WILL HUMBLE AND THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES TO STOP DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE AND DAMAGING INFORMATION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS CASE has put the Plaintiff at a great disadvantage.
26. Denying a “stay” that the Plaintiff never asked for instead of issuing a statutory interpretation of law that the Plaintiff has begged for from the beginning to clarify the intent and meaning of A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) confuses and concerns the Plaintiff.
Eventually someone must tell the Emperor he wears no clothes.
1. Whereas the Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court to Reconsider the Denial of the Plaintiff’s ongoing quest to get an English translation and a statutory interpretation of the plain and simple language that constructs A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f).
2. Whereas the Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court to make a ruling that A.R.S. § 36-2804.02(A)(3)(f) does not construct, constitute or authorize a restriction on cultivation in the AMMA.
Respectfully submitted on February 13, 2015